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2013–14 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks
Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians began on 29 July 2013 following an attempt by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to restart the peace process.
Martin Indyk was appointed by the US to oversee the negotiations. Currently at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., during the Clinton administration he served as US ambassador to Israel, and was assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs. Hamas, the Palestinian government in Gaza, rejected Kerry's announcement, stating that Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has no legitimacy to negotiate in the name of the Palestinian people.
The negotiations were scheduled to last up to nine months to reach a final status to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by mid-2014. They started in Washington, DC and were slated to move to the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and finally to Hebron.〔Berman, Lazar. (7 August 2013) (US peace envoy to come to Israel next week ). The Times of Israel. Retrieved on 14 August 2013.〕 A deadline was set for establishing a broad outline for an agreement by 29 April 2014. On the expiry of the deadline, negotiations collapsed, with the US Special Envoy Indyk reportedly assigning blame mainly to Israel, while the US State Department insisting no one side was to blame but that "both sides did things that were incredibly unhelpful."〔AFP, ('US denies dismantling peace negotiators team,' ) Ynet, 6 May 2014.〕
==Pre-peace talk compromises==
Before the peace talks began, both sides offered concessions. The Palestinian Authority offered to put on hold international recognition as a state by applying to international organizations while Israel offered the release of 104 Palestinian prisoners, 14 of whom are Arab-Israelis and all of whom had been in Israeli jails since before the 1993 Oslo I Accord. The prisoners were responsible for killing, in all, 55 Israeli civilians, 15 Israeli security forces personnel, one French tourist and dozens of suspected Palestinian collaborators.〔
Commenters have however pointed out that Israel had already promised to release these same 104 Palestinians, back in 1999 under the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum,〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=The Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum )〕 but never did.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=PA welcomes Israeli decision to free Palestinian prisoners, vows to work for release of all inmates )〕 Critics also worry that Israel will simply quietly re-arrest the potentially released Palestinians, and state that Israel is using the slow release to hold the negotiations hostage and that the main goal of the release is to bolster Israel's image. According to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report, Israel's decision not to release the prisoners at the time was due to significantly increased violence against Israel by their partner in the memorandum, the PLO, leading up to the Second Intifada. In the time leading up to the planned release, Israel perceived "institutionalized anti-Israel, anti-Jewish incitement; the release from detention of terrorists; the failure to control illegal weapons; and the actual conduct of violent operations" as a sign that "the PLO has explicitly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence, thereby significantly eroding trust between the parties."
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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